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Abstract
This paper revisits the political thought of propagandist Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972), revisiting 
his idea of a Pan-European Union in the light of past and present crises of European identity. Looking at his 
changing conceptions of Europe’s frontiers, this article argues that Coudenhove’s case offers many insights 
to those who seek to understand the cultural prehistory of the Cold War frontiers. His movement constitutes 
an example of what Michael Freeden has called a ‘thin-centred ideology’, and the article proceeds by 
contextualising Coudenhove’s activities in the light of this paradigm. The article also reviews how historians’ 
interest in his work has been shaped by present crises in European integration. The history of Pan-Europa 
also offers a contextualisation of such phenomena as the rise of populism and the emergence of global pan-
movements in the wake of political crises. 
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Introduction
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972), the political influencer who popularised 
the idea of a Pan-European Union, has been a mainstay in the historiography on 
European integration practically from the moment he chose to inscribe himself in its 
bibliography in 1922 (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1922, 1923b). He continues to attract 
historians as an idiosyncratic personality, a person emblematic of his time which 
contained so much political promise but also radical socioeconomic uncertainty. With 
his Japanese mother and a father hailing from an old aristocratic family of crusaders, 
Coudenhove was much photographed by the emergent illustrated press. The ideology 
of Europe which he helped create also provided a sense of continuity between the 
interwar and postwar moments in European history. 
In the decades since his death, Coudenhove’s work has been the subject of several 
revivals, particularly among political historians. They took an interest in his work 
just as the cultural programmes of the European Union launched a number of funding 
streams promoting the history of European integration. The European University 
Institute, founded in 1976, where Coudenhove’s archive is now held along with 
other personal and institutional papers related to the history of the EU, also began 
its activities in this period. The first phase of historians’ engagement with his ideas 
can thus be dated from the mid-1980s to the 1990s, when proponents of European 
federalism drew on his work to polish their visions of Europe’s genealogy (Lipgens, 
1982).1 This was followed by a more historicist turn to Coudenhove’s biography 
as such, enabled by the opening of archives in post-Soviet Russia (Conze, 2004; 
Heffernan, 1998). The Vienna files of the Paneuropean Union became a trophy in 
Moscow’s military archives, where they had been held in secret since the Second 
World War.2 Finally, in the 2000s, new critical scholarship of European integration 
had emerged, which revisited the idea of Europe in terms of its social history and its 
institutional realisation (Müller, 1999, 2005; Paul, 2003). This generation of historians 
also took into account the impact on Europeanist political thought from the political 
right, as well as the place of Europe’s colonial legacy in ideas of the continent’s 
unification.3 Here again, Coudenhove’s work proved indispensable, bringing to the 
fore his flirtations with Mussolini’s fascism and his apologetic views on European 
colonialism. The most recent wave of historical interest in Coudenhove’s work comes 
from scholars working on the political thought of other European regions, notably, 
Turkey, as well as those contrasting Coudenhove’s conception of Europe with its 
‘others’ (Barlas & Güvenc, 2009; Gulsah Capan & Onursal, 2007; Stråth, 2010).
1 On the research into European integration promoted around the time of the Maastricht treaty, see Shore 
(2000), Delanty (1995). For a great overview, see also Woolf (2003).
2 On eulogistic readings of Coudenhove-Kalergi, see Burgard (2000), Gehler (2002), Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler 
(2004). The first biography was by a Japanese scholar, Morinosuke Kajima (1971).
3 On critical scholarship in this vein, see Conze (2005), Hansen and Jonsson (2014), Botz-Bornstein (2007), 
and Richard (2014).
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Why return to Coudenhove’s political thought once again? Seeing European identity 
through Coudenhove’s eyes enables us to analyse from a historical and comparative 
perspective how times of political disorientation can be conducive to the emergence 
of cross-party ideological movements. His ideas are also of relevance to those who 
are interested in historicising recent political crises. In this paper, I hope to shed light 
on Coudenhove’s project as an ideology which emerged in response to European 
disintegration, rather than looking at it as a milestone in the teleology of European 
integration. His ideas made up what the political philosopher Michael Freeden has 
called a ‘thin-centred ideology’: a formation prompted by an acute perception of a 
present crisis – in his case, the collapse of the old continental European empires - 
which, however, was not matched by a commitment to a comprehensive solution to 
this crisis (see Freeden, 1998). Coudenhove’s views of Europe’s political frontiers, 
which responded to a succession of dramatic political changes in his own lifetime, 
can enable historians to better understand the relationship between individual agency 
and political ideology. 
The historiography on Coudenhove-Kalergi has itself become an area of 
political thought within which changing ideas about European identity have been 
expressed. But while previous engagements with his work - particularly in the ‘end 
of ideology’ atmosphere at the end of the Cold War - have linked him to the history 
of European integration, the most recent chill in political relations in Europe and 
other, more global, political crises, open up a different picture. Today, the relevance 
of his ideas comes from the insights which might be gleaned from his work as a 
political influencer in a postimperial world. Today’s political analysts are constantly 
re-examining the categories within which to understand how modern-day Russia and 
Turkey grapple with their former imperial legacies, new national and secessionist 
movements, and the challenges of economic globalisation.4 Understanding the 
evolution of Coudenhove’s ideas can arguably facilitate a more historically granular 
understanding of postimperial anxiety about Europe’s frontiers.
Coudenhove’s mode of working, lobbying across ideological frontiers and in the 
communities of bankers and entrepreneurs with which he was familiar, has a very 
contemporary resonance for a range of reasons. He not only sought out a range 
of creative mechanisms for maximising economic as well as cultural forms of 
influence. By turning his journal into a platform where his contemporaries’ views 
of Europe’s past and future could be shared through polls and questionnaires, he 
was also singularly receptive to the contemporary phenomena of his time such as 
the rise of electorate polling and the use of referenda in determining the outcomes 
4 On the current crisis of European frontiers, see, for instance, Dov Bachmann and Gunneriusson (2015), 
Shevtsova (2015), and, on the Turkish case, Bacik (2011). 
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of postwar geopolitical conflicts.5 Coudenhove was not only an opinion trendsetter. 
His magazine fostered the emergence of Europeanist thought by collecting critical 
surveys and acting as a soundbox for ideas of Europe. 6 Together with other 
initiatives promoting broader, supra-political causes, Coudenhove’s work belonged 
to the category of ‘non-governmental organizations’ (Boli & Thomas, 1999).7 Yet 
the history of Coudenhove’s ‘thin-centred’ ideology also shows the limits of his 
popular appeal. 
 
Democracy and Moderate Nationalism: Paneuropa in the Interwar Period
Coudenhove was only twenty-eight when he launched his proposal for a Pan-
European union; his last work on the subject, Europe as a World Power, was published 
when he was nearly eighty (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1971). The actual demands of his 
programme, and particularly, Coudenhove’s attitude towards political ideologies and 
forms of government, changed multiple times throughout this period. The initial aim 
of the Paneuropean Manifesto was the reconciliation of nations along pacifist and 
democratic ideals after the disasters of the First World War. In fact, leading pacifists 
had claimed that Coudenhove had stolen some of their ideas from them (Wehberg, 
1927, pp. 102-103). Coudenhove’s work at this time bore the influence of masonic 
ideas, a result of his membership of the masonic lodge Humanitas until he resigned 
in 1926. Coudenhove emphasised the emotional, economic and political bonds which 
tie Europeans to each other, and depicted his ideal Europe as a federation of national 
democracies (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1924c). Not all European states were also pan-
European: as a political concept, Coudenhove’s Europe comprised all ‘democratic 
states of continental Europe including Iceland’. By the same logic, the European 
part of Turkey still belonged politically to Asia. Likewise, Russia under Bolshevik 
influence was increasingly moving away from Europe politically (Coudenhove-
Kalergi, 1924c, p. 36). At different moments, he defined Europe principally in terms 
of its opposition to different cultural or political entities. This included continents 
– Asia and America; political federations - Britain and the Commonwealth, and the 
Soviet Union; cultural communities, such as Islam and Muslim civilization; and new 
states such as Turkey.
Scholars’ assessments of Coudenhove’s political orientation have ranged from 
liberal internationalism to Christian conservatism (Conze, 2004; Heffernan, 1998).8 
5 On referenda as a feature of the political landscape after the First World War, see Conrad (2015) and 
Qvortrup (2015). 
6 See especially the discussion of opinion polls in Majer and Höhne (2014). 
7 On the intellectual context of aristocratic German-speaking authors writing on Europe’s future, see 
Gusejnova (2016).
8 On neo-aristocratic thought, see also Breuer (1999; 2001).
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His values were conservative but he considered his thought to be in a tradition of 
utopian writing inviting social and political reform, which meant that he included 
elements of socialist welfare in his programme, accompanied by an economic policy 
based on German national liberal traditions advocated by such thinkers as Friedrich 
List. Dictatorship and monarchy were negative terms for him, leadership, democracy 
and aristocracy positive terms. He described his own views as ‘neoaristocratic’ and 
argued that humanity needed spiritual and ethical leaders, and that a community of 
such leaders who wanted the best for humanity was worth aspiring to.
In addition to pacifism and democracy, Coudenhove had specific ideas about the 
economic dimension of European unification. He acknowledged the existence of 
national interests, but he was also keen to explore what might be meant by a common, 
pan-European interest. Because the League of Nations was a global organisation, 
it could not be trusted with safeguarding the interests of Europeans, he thought. 
Mustering economic strength in a global intercontinental competition required 
rethinking the way resources were used, including the colonial question. Coudenhove 
emphasised that without colonies, Europe had 5 million square miles and 300 million 
inhabitants. With colonies, it had a much larger territory of 25 million square miles but 
without an equally large population – a total of 348 million. The untapped resource 
of Europe’s colonies was therefore a highly promising foundation for cementing 
Europe’s future as a world power. Two further sectors of importance were coal and 
steel, and banking. Towards the end of the 1920s, Coudenhove developed more 
precise ideas about the organisation of the internal economy in facilitating European 
integration, advocating a kind of corporatism which was also then developed on the 
political right by politicians such as Dollfuss and Mussolini. This was matched by 
his practical attempts to influence policy by drawing on connections in the banking 
and industrial sectors from Germany, Czechoslovakia, France, and Austria. His list of 
supporters included the Czech entrepreneur (and owner of the famous shoe production 
chain), Tomas Bata; the German industrialists Paul Silverberg, Carl Siemens, Adam 
Opel, Edmund Stinnes, Richard Gütermann, and Hermann Bücher (of the AEG); 
Carl Duisberg (of the Bayer corporation); the bankers Herbert Gutmann, Arthur 
Gwinner, Hans Fürstenberg, and Carl Melchior (a friend of Rathenau’s); the Dutch 
industrialist N.V. Philips; and the Austrian Otto Böhler; as well as the German Danat, 
Mendelssohn, and Warburg banks.9
There was thus a combination of theoretical and pragmatic elements in his thinking 
about European identity. Keeping these together required political organisation. The 
dangers for Europe lay in discord based on competing national interests, which 
9 See Coudenhove to Louis Loucheur, 3 February 1928, 3 May 1928, telegram of 10 December 1928, and 19 
January 1929, in Stanford, Hoover Institution Archives (HA), Loucheur Papers. 
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ran the danger of developing into an economy of small states, or Kleinstaaterei. 10 
To overcome these moments of discord, Coudenhove proposed using America as 
an example, which used its hegemony to foster Pan-American connections without 
the need to form one American superstate. The Pan-American conferences, which 
started in 1881 and took place in a different American nation each time, served 
Coudenhove as an inspiration for launching his own series of conferences and a 
journal accompanying the movement. 
To say that Coudenhove emphasised democracy as a necessary feature of 
Europe’s future requires qualification. The democratic element in his plan was 
understood not as an expression of the cumulative interests of individual citizens, 
but rather, of the group interests of nations. Coudenhove’s ideal model comprised 
two houses of parliament whereby one chamber – the larger one - represented 
nations or peoples, and another chamber represented states. This was rather similar 
to the way democratic elements had been introduced to Austro-Hungarian politics 
after the compromises between the House of Austria and the various nations of 
the empire.11 The main source of influence in this respect was the work of Aurel 
Popovici (1863-1917), an Austrian political thinker of Romanian background 
who, in 1906, had published a proposal for the United States of Greater Austria 
in Leipzig (Popovici, 1906, 1918). Popovici wanted to give the different ethno-
cultural components of the Austro-Hungarian empire greater national autonomy 
in matters of culture and education within the empire; in exchange, they would 
remain bound to Greater Austria – as opposed to Hungary - by means of a 
federal union. This union would comprise fifteen quasi-independent units defined 
by language. Each of the fifteen states in the union would receive votes in the 
legislative chamber of the imperial government. In addition to his desire to reform 
the Habsburg empire, Popovici’s theory was influenced by Swiss federalism, 
particularly, the ideas of the legal theorist Johann Caspar Bluntschli, and the 
constitutional model of the United States.12 He stated his explicit motivation in 
writing the work, aside from being a call to reject Magyarization, was to ensure 
the ‘future of the Habsburg empire’.13 However, what distinguishes his proposal 
from Coudenhove’s is Popovici’s outspoken anti-Semitism and the attack on what 
he called the ‘Jewish liberal press’ which he associated with such mainstream 
Viennese newspapers such as Neue Freie Presse.
10 Coudenhove to Louis Loucheur, 1928, p. 39. 
11 On democratic politics in the Habsburg empire, see Judson (2016).
12 He cites extensively from Bluntschli (1886), as well as idem, Bluntschli (1881). See also Auerbach (1898), 
Gumplowicz (1879), Chamberlain (1899, vol. I, p. 263; C. Darwin, Animals and Plants under Domestication, 
ch. xV and xix apud Chamberlain, here p. 8 footnote 5). The rest Spencer (1904), recommends to the 
Japanese to abstain from racial mixture. 89. Gobineau and le Bon (1894). Other citations are of Disraeli’s 
novel Coningsby, to Carlyle and Macaulay, and to J.C.L. Sismondi (1839).
13 Popovici (1906), dedication to the reader.
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Aside from these texts of Habsburg policy, Coudenhove also relied on a number 
of canonical works of political thought as a source of inspiration. Nietzsche’s Will to 
Power manuscripts (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1930, pp. 95–101) were part of a reading 
list Coudenhove-Kalergi set for future Paneuropeans, which also included Napoleon’s 
Political Testament,14 as well as a dozen or so other works by Dante, Comenius, 
Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini (see, for instance, Saint-Pierre, 1714; Fénelon, 1720). 
Drawing on Giuseppe Mazzini’s Europe: Its Conditions and Prospects, Coudenhove 
picked up on the traditions of the Young Europe movement, which bridged 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism (Bayly & Biagini 2008). The combination of the 
two principles was what motivated him to include the Bohemian humanist Comenius. 
Coudenhove’s journal, Paneuropa, devoted a great deal of attention to publishing 
seminal texts in which European identity was discussed. At the opening of the first 
Paneuropean Congress in 1924, Coudenhove’s wife Ida Roland recited Victor Hugo’s 
speech on European unification ‘in the service of propaganda for the Paneuropean 
idea’.15 Further congresses were held in Berlin in 1930, in Basel in 1932, in Vienna 
again in 1935, and finally, in exile, in New York in 1943.
Another element in Coudenhove’s political thought was his conviction that the 
distinction between key forms of government available to modern civilizations had 
itself been worked through European history, during which republics had defeated 
monarchies in the long run. By contrast to the early nineteenth century, when the 
Holy Alliance of European monarchies could be equally used to express European 
solidarity as Mazzini’s republicanism, by the twentieth century, Coudenhove argued, 
the principle of republicanism associated with Mazzini had defeated the principle of 
monarchical internationalism associated with Metternich. ‘The World War brought 
about the decision about: Mazzini attained victory over Metternich, the thrones of 
Central and Eastern Europe tumbled, the suppressed nations obtained their freedom, 
Europe became democratic, and this broke the path for the creation of a new, 
sixth Europe.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1924b). As Coudenhove envisaged it, if the 
Europeans followed his plan, they would eschew the vexed question of sovereignty 
by becoming a movement which would be a supra-party lobbying group internally, 
and a federative international association externally (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1931b). 
Its foundation was to be economic integration and the joint exploitation of Europe’s 
African colonies – with the exception of the Commonwealth, which, in the early 
drafts of the programme, would remain the prerogative of Britain.
On account of its dominions, Britain was unable to commit to another union of 
comparable size, as Coudenhove argued, and had to be excluded for reasons of a 
14 Reprinted in Paneuropa (1929, pp. 18-22).
15 Victor Hugo, ‘United States of Europe’, speech held at the Paris Peace Congress of 1849. Ida Roland recited 
it at the Paneuropa Congress in Berlin in 1930. Mentioned in ‘Wiederauftreten Ida Rolands in Wien’, Neue 
Freie Presse, 7 June 1933. 
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global balance of power; while Pan-Europe was to be modelled after what Coudenhove 
called ‘Pan-America’ both in its federal structure and its attitude to colonial resource. 
Coudenhove’s demands were, first, a revision of the Versailles agreement, especially 
with regard to the question of the German (and Austrian) war guilt; a ‘perpetual’ peace 
between all the European states; doing away with any customs and other economic 
borders and bringing about a unified currency; a joint army and fleet; a European 
‘limes’ on its East border and erosion of all inner European borders; a true guarantee 
of minority rights and the introduction of punishment for any propaganda of hate in 
the press; a Europeanization of education at schools; and a pan-European constitution.
Paneuropa, this non-partisan, partly technocratic, partly utopian federation of 
interests represented by national chambers in a republican and democratic model 
of government, required sentimental bonds as well as practical projects to make 
the project viable. Coudenhove found the sentimental element in the cultivation 
of admiration of great historical personalities who acted as an inspiration for more 
than one European nation, and even beyond: Kant, Nietzsche, Mazzini, Napoleon, 
Dante, and others.16 The cultivation of character – a mixture between the ideal of 
the old nobility and the dream of a new mixed-race, educated type of person – was 
a key element of the plan to make Europe come together despite divergent national 
and regional interests, and in the absence of monarchies and dynastic loyalties. The 
leader [‘Führer’] was to replace the ruler [‚Herrscher‘] as a political type, and this 
would enable the idea marriage between romantic utopianism and pragmatic realism 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1925a). 
Technological solutions were another model for activity. Among Coudenhove’s 
least successful attempts to influence government members was his attempt at a 
solution of the Polish corridor problem, which, being an outcome of the Versailles 
settlement, separated two parts of Prussia from each other. Coudenhove sent letters 
of consultation both to the German and the Polish governments and also published 
information on it in his Paneuropa publishing house. His plan was based on the 
recognition that European peace was only possible if Germany was at peace both with 
France and with Poland. Realising that Poland found it unacceptable to renounce its 
only access to its main port, Gdynia, whilst Germany could not accept the separation 
of East Prussia from its territory, Coudenhove argued that the area around the corridor 
had to be marked by a line under German sovereignty on which would pass a ‘double 
railway line and an automobile route which would connect Danzig viz. East Prussia 
with the rest of the Reich territory.’17 Coudenhove emphasised that where this line 
could not be maintained without infringing on Polish transportation within the corridor, 
16 Ignaz Seipel opening first Paneuropa Congress of 1926, Fond 554.7.470.343-416, Coudenhove-Kalergi 
papers, RGVA, Moscow.
17 Coudenhove-Kalergi to Reichskanzler, in BA, R 43 I/125, pp. 364-377.
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‘it will have to pass subterraneously through a tunnel. A commission consisting of a 
representative of the German and the Polish government coordinates all the conflicts 
resulting from this technical-juridical construction’, Coudenhove suggested. His 
plan included the construction of a Polish canal for its commercial traffic involving 
the Swiss engineer Jules Jaeger and his son Charles, who had already excelled with 
a construction of bridges and dams in Switzerland. ‘Now they have spontaneously 
decided to provide a plan for the technical solution of the question of the Polish 
corridor’ which, Coudenhove argued, would ‘turn out cheaper than half a battleship.’ 
Coudenhove summed up his proposal as an attempt ‘to find extraordinary solutions 
for extraordinary problems’, one that the spirit of the twentieth century demanded.18 
In March 1931, Coudenhove wrote from Paris about his encounter with Polish Prime 
Minister August Zaleski, who, according to Coudenhove, expressed his willingness 
to meet the German High Chancellor in Geneva or elsewhere in order to discuss the 
matter with him in person.19 Like Coudenhove, Beneš and Masaryk, Zaleski joined 
the freemasons during World War I, when he worked as a lecturer in Polish language 
and literature in London. He was foreign minister of Poland between 1926 and 1932. 
State secretary von Bülow distanced himself from Coudenhove’s involvement in 
government decisions, writing in internal chancery communications that ‘Count 
Coudenhove-Kalergie’s [sic] conversations on foreign policy, which he speaks about 
in his letter to the Reich chancellor, are entirely unwelcome to German politics. […] 
We have always held that palliative little means to alleviate certain particularly evident 
grievances on the Eastern frontier do not help us.’ Bülow suggested responding 
to Coudenhove with an abrupt confirmation of receipt: ‘Such a way of putting it 
would also have the benefit of preventing the Count from seeking to muddle through 
using special connections’. In response to Coudenhove’s attached printed proposal 
for the Polish corridor, one civil servant (Oberregierungsrat Planck) commented in 
internal correspondence on 16 August 1931: ‘Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s proposal 
continues to be unwelcome.’ The incident nonetheless demonstrates the combination 
of idealism and practical intervention which characterized Coudenhove’s ideas. 
Importantly, European civilization for Coudenhove was as much an 
accomplishment of earlier ages, as it was a task for the future. Increasingly, his 
thinking about Europe shifted from territorial to temporal dimensions. Initially, the 
Paneuropean programme was accompanied by a map which showed Europe as one 
territory without borders, with the exception of Turkey, which was marked with 
a question mark. The Paneuropa programme demanded a ‘systematic exploration 
of the European economic colony of West Africa (French Africa, Libya, the 
18 Coudenhove-Kalergi to the Reichskanzler. Paris, 27 March 1931, in BA R 43 I/125, pp. 265-266. On 
the handling of the Danzig corridor issue, see also section on ‘Die Kabinette Brüning I u. II’ (Erdman & 
Koops, 1982). The ‘corridor inside a corridor’ had also been suggested by the French diplomat Wladimir 
d´Ormesson. 
19 Coudenhove-Kalergi to Reichskanzler, in BA, R 43 I/125, pp. 364-377.
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Congo, Angola) as a European resource’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1924a). By 1934, 
Coudenhove emphasised the significance of European identity as a community of 
values which was to some extent independent on the precise nature of its territory. 
It was constituted by ideas, including ‘Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christian 
religion, the lifestyle of a true gentleman and the declaration of human rights’ 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1925b). The question mark on Turkey was due to some of its 
territorial belonging to Europe ‘despite’ its Muslim heritage. By the mid-1930s, he 
overcame this in favour of a culturally transcendent conception of modernity, which, 
in the Turkish case, he associated with the impact of Mustafa Kemal on his society 
and its relations with Ottoman successor states such as Greece.
Coudenhove himself was one of several intellectuals of aristocratic background 
who made his provenance part of his campaign, alongside figures such as Karl 
Hubertus zu Löwenstein, Prince Karl Anton Rohan and Count Hermann Keyserling 
(Reytier, 2004; Gusejnova,  2013).20 In his view, the European aristocracy had not only 
shown the negative effects of this isolationist practice, but also ‚kept the bourgeoisie 
away from itself‘. It was a paradox that even the democratic states of Europe still 
entrusted their affairs to the descendants of aristocrats. ‘For many generations, 
the European blood nobility has lived in a political atmosphere which barred the 
bourgeoisie from entry into politics. […] Politics is an art, not a science. […] In the 
sciences, the bourgeoisie excels over the aristocracy in terms of talent: in politics, the 
relationship is reversed. This is why Europe’s democracies also frequently entrust 
their government to descendants of high nobility, for it is in the reason of state to 
make the inherited mass of political talent accumulated by the nobility over the years 
available to all.’ (Coudenhove, 1925a, p. 47). Despite this effectively apologetic 
attitude towards social inequality in European history, Coudenhove also affirmed 
the importance of racial and cultural mixing. The ideal European was multiracial, a 
‘planetary type’ – rather like the high aristocracy in its ethos, but the opposite of its 
principle of inbreeding. 
The creation of a future European civilization also required consciousness of clear 
boundaries between Paneuropa and other world regions, in particular, empires and 
states with new imperial ambitions. There were three states with a significant presence 
in Europe who could not be represented in his model, at least as first articulated in 
the 1920s -- Russia, Turkey, and Britain. These exceptional cases of European (or 
partially European) states which were to be excluded from a future European Union 
stood alongside the ‘natural’ others of Asia and Pan-America. What distinguished 
all three cases was their difficult relationship to their own empires: the Soviet Union 
had succeeded the Russian empire in a way in which the Commonwealth was in the 
20 See also Prince Karl Anton Rohan’s journal Europäische Revue, which was first published in 1925 (Vienna 
and Berlin, 1925-1943). 
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process of replacing the old structures of empire in Britain. Modern Turkey was, 
similarly to the Soviet Union, a modern state whose identity was built on rejecting its 
Ottoman past and yet whose hegemony drew on its legacies. Coudenhove’s Paneurope 
movement was to have its base in Vienna. On the surface, Austria was, of course, also 
a postimperial successor state, but one with no claim to hegemony whatsoever. It was 
this diminished status in the modern world – together with the consciousness of its 
historic past --- which gave Vienna the capacity to lead a new movement whose aim 
was to regenerate a new European patriotism.
The symbol of the Paneuropa movement, a red cross against the yellow sun of 
Hellenic Greece, reveals the intellectual legacies to which Coudenhove imagined 
himself heir: what could be called the Christian tradition of geopolitical integration, 
historically framed from the Crusades, to the European unification models of Abbé 
St. Pierre, and to the Christian socialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Within this tradition, freemasonry was an important sub-group; and indeed, 
Coudenhove himself regarded Enlightenment projects which themselves criticised 
Christian traditions as falling within the Christian trajectory. The intellectual background 
of masonic eclecticism merged neo-Hellenic ideals with Kantian rationalism as well 
as the German ideal of Bildung, the ideal of culture and education, together with more 
recent calls for German cultural unity and an imperial discourse. These strands of 
thought were invoked at Coudenhove’s first international Paneuropa congress. 
This genealogy of European unity as Coudenhove presented it was thus composed 
of several sometimes contradictory traditions: ideas of a Christian Empire and 
monarchy; ideas of national liberation which were based on resistance to large 
dynasties; ideas of a balance of power and contrary ideas of economic integration 
by its critics; and the emphasis on charismatic political leadership and technology 
as features of modern political systems, against the neo-medievalism of some of his 
other beliefs. Coudenhove’s Christian–Hellenic baggage did not prevent him from 
speaking of Vienna as ‘the Mecca of the Paneuropean Union’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
1949). In establishing this account of Paneuropa’s pedigree, Coudenhove not only 
marketed the noble ancestry of his own idea, but also sought to borrow authorities 
from other political movements. He reclaimed Kant and Grotius from Wilson and the 
liberal internationalists; Mazzini from the European nationalists such as Masaryk; 
and Victor Hugo from the social democrats. In drawing on a variety of authors, 
Coudenhove emphasised the inherently cosmopolitan background of the European 
ideal. The masonic eclecticism of his ideal of Europe was, interestingly, strongly 
reminiscent of the City of the Sun narrative by Tommaso de Campanella, whose 
depiction of this ideal city included references to Egyptian and Roman polytheism 
just as to Christianity, Islam, and fiction.
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Britain, Coudenhove argued, had to be excluded for reasons of a global balance 
of power, while Paneuropa was to be modelled after what Coudenhove called 
‘Pan-America’ both in its federal structure and its attitude to colonial resource. 
Coudenhove’s called for a revision of the Versailles agreement, especially with 
regard to the question of German (and Austrian) war guilt; a perpetual peace between 
all the European states; doing away with any customs and other economic borders 
and bringing about a unified currency; a joint army and fleet; a European limes on 
its eastern border and erosion of all inner European borders; a true guarantee of 
minority rights and the introduction of punishment for any propaganda of hate in 
the press; a Europeanization of education at schools; and a Paneuropean constitution 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1922, pp. 3-4). Paneuropa was thus based on an essentialist 
perspective on European identity, and yet demanded policies of identity construction 
through education and infrastructure.21
With its combination of idealism and pragmatism, Coudenhove’s Pan-Europe 
bore the mark of a postimperial project which sought to preserve whatever good 
elements could be rescued from the Habsburg empire He saw danger in any form 
of extreme nationalism, which had long threatened and in the end fatally weakened 
the Habsburgs. The Austrian government had offered Coudenhove offices in the 
Vienna Hofburg, which allowed the movement to be registered under the illustrious 
address of ‘Paneuropa, Hofburg, Wien’ until the annexation of Austria by Germany 
in 1938 (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1966a pp. 223-224). This expressed symbolically how 
significant the Habsburg legacy and its prestige were for the movement’s operations, 
but also its limits in the face of new, more aggressive movements for Greater Germany.
A key element to Coudenhove’s political thought was his view of Europe as a 
world power with a special claim to the concept of civilization. Despite some unique 
characteristics, Coudenhove’s work can be best understood when considered in the 
broader intellectual context of works on the idea of Europe, as diverse as Oswald 
Spengler’s Decline of the West (1918-23) or Hermann Keyserling’s Das Spektrum 
Europas (1928), which were themselves a response to questions raised by a previous 
generation of intellectuals, notably, Nietzsche.22 As Coudenhove himself put it, in the 
interwar period, ‘the only [true] Europeans were the writers’, mentioning authors like 
Heinrich Mann or Maximilian Harden (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1966a, p. 121). Writers 
21 First formulated in 1922, it reached a wider English-speaking audience in the 1930s (see Coudenhove-
Kalergi, 1931c).
22 Nietzsche, 2002; esp. Preface (pp. 1-4), part 5 ‘On the natural history of morals‘ (pp. 75-92), part 8 ‘Peoples 
and fatherlands’ (pp. 131-150) and part 9 ‘What is noble?’ (pp. 151-177). For Coudenhove’s contemporaries 
Politis (1946, pp. 129–131); Brockhausen (1924); la Rochelle (1931); Delaisi (1929). In his 1929 book 
Les Deux Europes, Delaisi described the division of Europe in two halves, ‘Europe A’ and ‘Europe B’. 
The former consisted of the wealthy and industrialised countries in Western Europe, the latter of the newly 
founded states of Eastern Europe with a mainly agricultural economy (Febvre, 1999; see also Dawson, 1932, 
1934, 1941, 1944–57; Fisher, 1938).
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of international fame, like the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore, the English novelist 
H.G.Wells, the French novelists André Malraux and Romain Rolland, who enjoyed 
the status of intellectual celebrities at the time. 
Such authors published in multiple journals, their texts appeared in different 
forms and translations in a diversity of journals discussing geographical and 
cultural identity. Some of the Europeanist authors, like Coudenhove himself, but 
also his great rival, Prince Karl Anton Rohan, ran their own journals. Rohan’s 
Europäische Revue attracted a wide range of authors, from German conservative 
revolutionaries and associated authors, such as Carl Schmitt, Max Scheler, 
but also more moderate conservatives like Hugo von Hofmannsthal, to French 
radical socialists and Italian syndicalists; among its international authors were 
Paul Painlevé, the humanitarian, Paul Langevin, the radical socialist, as well as 
Italian fascists like the corporatist Giuseppe Bottai (Bock, 1994; Müller, 2005). 
In parallel to Coudenhove’s masonic elements, this journal had a Christian theme 
running through its issues, positing Christianity as a source of a shared European 
identity, and operated with the term ‘Mitteleuropa’. Apart from the nature of the 
desired political order in Europe, which was the journal´s main focus, its authors 
also wrote extensively on America and international relations beyond Europe 
(Bühler, 1929; Halfeld, 1928; Lanux, 1929; Seed, 1928). 
Intellectuals like Coudenhove were reacting to changes which affected the 
character of public discussion of Europe after the end of the First World War. 
Intellectuals became more politically engaged, and as a result journals which had 
been apolitical before began to address more openly political debates; in addition, 
because of the decline of salon culture, new journals and publishing houses promoting 
‘worldviews’ rather than specific party political programmes became widespread. 
This new interest in geopolitcs and the revived interest in exoticist critiques of 
Europe brought about a new wave of journals theorising European identity (see 
especially Schmitt, 1929). Journals can thus be used to trace the changing political 
character of such social ‘configurations’ of intellectuals as expressionism. Like 
other contemporaries, Coudenhove founded a dedicated journal and a publishing 
house to vent his own ideas. In the course of the 1930s, when he developed plans 
for a European Academy at Prague,
Coudenhove-Kalergi invited the German geographer Karl Haushofer for a position 
as a Fellow of this academy, and furthered contacts with other theorists of geopolitics 
as well.23 In Britain in this period, thinking about Europe’s future had its place at 
Chatham House, a think tank which was founded in the wake of the First World war 
23 On the German geopolitical tradition that emerged in the wake of World War I, see Kjellén (1917; 1930); see 
also Bassin (2004), and Heffernan (1998).
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and had its own outlet, the Journal of International Affairs.24 Coudenhove addressed 
members of the house both in person and through correspondence with some of its 
members, which included Arnold Toynbee and Leo Amery, both of whom had a past 
working for British intelligence in the Balkans.
If we look at the variety of authors publishing in journals discussing European 
identity and the authors whose books were reviewed there, the diversity of the political 
spectrum associated with Europeanism becomes amply apparent. It is difficult to 
say what united authors contributing either to Europeanist journals or to journals 
in related fields discussed above. Such authors ranged from socialists like Emile 
Vandervelde or Hendrik de Man, to conservatives like Hugo von Hofmannsthal, 
to corporatists and chauvinists like Othmar Spann. They problematised German, 
Slavic and Jewish identities. Authors of fiction publishing in these journals included 
utopianists, orientalists, and ‘critical realists’. Political and religious movements 
represented ranged from Catholicism to Judaism, from feminism to male chauvinism. 
Even though some of the journals developed in more defined directions in the course 
of their existence – thus the Europäische Revue became known for its ‘conservative 
revolutionary’ stance, for instance – no label can adequately characterise these 
journals because most of their authors contributed to several journals simultaneously. 
They wanted to transcend the ideologies of existing parties – for they united writers 
of different political beliefs; and yet produce an alternative worldview of European 
identity which could serve political ends.
 
Learning from the Balkans, and Pragmatism against Totalitarianism
By the mid-1930s, Coudenhove changed his mind about the future of Europe. 
First, he now actively pursued both Turkey and Britain as members of his movement 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1931a, pp.13-14). This change echoed that of some of his 
key rivals, such as Prince Karl Anton Rohan, whose journal, the Europäische Revue, 
also ran a special issue concerning Turkey with Turkish contributors (more on this, 
see Greiner, 2015). Like Coudenhove, Rohan at this time welcomed discussion of 
corporatist forms of government. His goal for a European order can be described 
along the lines of a state which can but does not have to comprise elements of 
democracy (Fourgeaud, 1929). In the 1930s, Coudenhove travelled to Constantinople 
and London, with speaking engagements in such places as Chatham House. At this 
time, he began to focus on analysing and praising more modest examples of success 
in different European regions. In particular, he praised the way the Balkan states had 
24 On the British reception of Paneuropa, Quincy Wright, review of Pan-Europe by Richard N. Coudenhove-
Kalergi, in Political Science Quarterly (1927); Arthur Deerin Call, review of Pan-Europe by Richard 
N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, in The American Journal of International Law (1927). See also Amery (1930), 
Toynbee (1931), and Parmar (2002). See also Ashworth (2002), Rich (2002), Pugh (2002), and Porter 
(2002).
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achieved reconciliation by such mechanisms as the population exchange between 
Greece and Turkey led by Eleftherios Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal, and the founding 
of the Balkan Entente of 1934 (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1937a, 122). He also began to 
explore alternatives to democracy as a means of European unification. Coudenhove 
believed that ‘Nietzsche’s Will to Power is where the foundational thoughts of fascist 
and Paneuropean politics stand side by side’. Youthfulness was a common theme 
with the new political movements like fascism, which Coudenhove distinguished 
sharply from National Socialism due to its comparative lack of emphasis on the racial 
question (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923a, p. 1). 
What had caused the changes in his views about Europe’s frontiers at key junctures? 
There were a number of reasons. The economic crisis put an end to the optimism 
regarding technocratic and financial means of European unification. This encouraged 
Coudenhove to devote more attention to the question of economic cooperation across 
ideological and national fault lines.25 Coincidentally, some of the political champions 
of his ideas in Europe, such as Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand, had died at 
the same time. Then came the rise to power of the Nazis and the development of 
its plans for European domination. As a result of all this, Coudenhove’s plans not 
only became more reactive in character, but also changed focus. He recognised that 
his contemporaries, too, were increasingly uncertain about the relationship between 
Europe’s geographical borders and its political frontiers, and even started a survey in 
his journal to capture this uncertainty. Three answers were possible: the Urals, the Sea 
of Marmara, and an open answer. Of 42 respondents he recorded, 27 chose the Urals 
and 18 chose the Russian-Bulgarian border in the Sea of Marmara (Coudenhove-
Kalergi, 1935, 1938). To verify the foundations of people’s opinions, Coudenhove 
included another survey in a later issue, which asked whether the Russian revolution 
of 1917 or subsequent central European revolutions in 1918 had made a difference to 
the way people conceptualised the border (Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, 2004, p. 338).
Coudenhove’s own shift from thinking about Europe in terms of frontiers to 
thinking about it in terms of integrated regions deserves closer analysis. According 
to Coudenhove’s own memories, the Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos had 
urged him to consider Turkey as a potential member of Paneuropa, having himself 
been at the forefront of Greco-Turkish reconciliation. ‘I recollect how the great Greek 
statesman Venizelos explained to me his decision to go to Ankara to offer Kemal 
Ataturk a pact of close cooperation and friendship, after the horrors and atrocities 
of the last war between Greeks and Turks and after six centuries of blood and hate. 
Both men were big enough to start a new page of history.’ (Barlas & Güven, 2009). 
The means of achieving this was population exchange, confirmed in the course of 
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which resulted in greater ethnic homogeneity of both 
25 Cf. economic Pan-European congresses held from 1929 to 1936. 
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Turkey and Greece – an aspect which should have alerted Coudenhove with his 
advocacy for cultural mixing, and yet something he was willing to overlook in the 
interests of peace. Over 1.5 million people from both nations were affected by the 
exchange.26 The Greek international lawyer Nicholas Politis, who in 1924 became 
the Greek Ambassador in Paris, was a long-standing member of the Paneuropean 
movement. He was Coudenhove’s connection to the League of Nations, and initiated 
a study group on European unification there at the time when Coudenhove and Briand 
worked together (Papadaki, 2012, p. 231). At this time, and until 1930, the League of 
Nations had also overseen the Greco-Turkish resettlement policy.
As a fellow Cretan (the Kalergis family was an old Cretan patrician family), 
Coudenhove felt an affinity with and a great sense of trust in Venizelos. Coudenhove 
also opened up his journal to publications by leading Greek politicians such as 
the banker and foreign minister in Venizelos’ government, Demetrios Maximos 
(Demetrios, 1934, p. 111–112). In 1943, when Coudenhove was mobilising for the 
idea of European federalism from New York, he approached Nellos Camellopoulos, 
a former member of the Greek Parliament, for support. While Turkish intellectuals 
were far less represented in Coudenhove’s circle and his bibliography, he did invite a 
contribution on the economy in modern Turkey by Bedri Tahir in 1934, following a 
visit to Turkey during which Coudenhove tried to mobilise an international alliance 
against Nazism (Bedri, 1934, pp. 115–117).27 By 1943, Coudenhove thought: ‘ The 
most important step toward such a new understanding between Europe and the Near 
East has been accomplished by Modern Turkey, that recently under its leader Kemal 
Ataturk, embraced without any European pressure all the vital elements of Western 
civilization. This Turkish Revolution is paving the way for a complete reconciliation 
between Europe and the Near East’.28 In the absence of history, modernity was a 
ticket to European civilization.
His encouragement for Britain to join the movement came in 1939 (Coudenhove-
Kalergi 1939).29 When he had first spoken at Chatham House eight years prior to 
that, Coudenhove met with a lukewarm reception when he entered into dialogue not 
only with metropolitan British internationalists and members of the government, but 
also with intellectuals involved in shaping Britain’s affairs in the Commonwealth, 
notably the Muslim representative of the Indian Congress, Yusuf Ali, who had also 
served on the Indian delegation to the League of Nations in 1928 (Coudenhove-
Kalergi, 1931c). Ali thought that Coudenhove’s insistence to exclude Britain as well 
as Russia made Paneuropa meaningless. ‘If Great Britain and the British Empire 
26 For details on the treaty, see Marrus (1985, p. 103).
27 On Coudenhove’s visit, see Barlas and Güven (2009, p. 438). 
28 ‘European Union is Favored. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi Replies to Some Objections to His Plan’, New 
York Times, 22 Dec 942.
29 Contrast with his earlier discussion of the subject Coudenhove-Kalergi (1931c).
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were excluded and if Russia were excluded, a great deal of the attraction and working 
chances of the idea would be removed.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1931c, p. 647). Ali 
added, however, that even if the plan for a federation did work, it would not be 
sustainable because there was no such a thing as a common European interest. 
Europe had conflicting regional interests, not to speak of colonial conflicts in Africa 
and the Indian Subcontinent. He highlighted especially the likely resistance of the 
European powers towards joint colonial exploitation, which they would interpret as 
a truncation. On top of that, he drew attention to the appeal of Russian influence 
and communist ideals for countries like India, due to the existing discontents there. 
Finally, there was there was the issue of emotional attachment, as he himself had 
experienced when representing India in Geneva, when ‘he had felt with pride that 
the British Empire was in position of arbitrator in the League.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
1931c, p. 647). Like the Turkish intellectuals of this period, Ali saw Coudenhove in 
competition with more pragmatic politicians like Aristide Briand, who was willing 
to work within the existing framework of a League of Nations through such practical 
schemes as tariff negotiations (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1931c, p. 648).30
Coudenhove implored his audience to help Europeans unite ‘in the same way that 
France helped Italy to unite in the nineteenth century’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1931c, 
p. 644). His host at Chatham house was Leo Amery, the leading British Conservative 
who had served as Colonial Secretary under the previous government and later 
became Secretary of State for India. In 1939, Amery was serving on the boards on a 
number of private companies, and was active in anti-appeasement campaigns. What 
connected Amery to Coudenhove was likely his own masonic background, as well as 
his mother’s Hungarian heritage, which had also paved the way for his deployment as 
an intelligence officer in the Balkans campaign during the First World War. However, 
he was also sceptical about the capacity to live with ‘two patriotisms’, one for Europe, 
and one for the British Empire. 
By the late 1930s, the League of Nations had become an established forum for 
discussing pan-regional identities (more on this, see Richard, 2012). Meanwhile, 
Coudenhove’s audience at Chatham House had become more narrowly confined 
to the vicissitudes of British national politics in the context of appeasement.31 
Coudenhove argued that it was not only in Britain’s strategic interest to ‘become 
European’, but that ‘by the invention of the aeroplane England ceased to be an island 
from a strategic point of view’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1939, p. 623). Conversely, the 
new totalitarian states, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, were a threat not just to 
Europe but to the entire League of Nations. This changed the relationship between 
30 On the Turkish reactions pitting Coudenhove as an alternative to Briand, see Capan and Onursal (2007).
31 The classic book of the time which captures this atmosphere was written under the pseudonym of Cato by a 
group of cross-bench authors, Michael Foot, Frank Owen and Peter Howard (1940).
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the two dramatically. Coudenhove also described his present as a kind of Cold War: 
‘Now we are facing the great problem whether or not Europe will emerge from the 
unbloody war in which we are living without having a bloody war.’ (Coudenhove-
Kalergi, 1939, p. 627). Even if that war should happen, in the longer term, he hoped 
that Britain would be working not for its own interests but also ‘for the liberty of the 
little States’ of Eastern and Central Europe (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1939, p. 631).
The list of attendees and their response to Coudenhove’s ideas offer much material 
for exploring the immediate context of thinking about Europe’s future, as Britain 
was struggling with questions of appeasement and strategic pro-communism. His 
discussants now consisted of largely English politicians with conservative views, an 
anti-appeasement stance, an interest in the Balkans and work in the Colonial Office. 
The only point of continuity with the meeting in 1931 was Leo Amery, who echoed 
Coudenhove’s sentiments about the need for European unity, but was sceptical 
about the possibility. In his view, by contrast to the British Commonwealth with 
its ‘historical unity’ provided by ‘a system of common ideals, of political liberty 
and of the reign of law’, Europe had to rely on a much older fabric of ideals drawn 
from ‘Greece, Rome and Palestine’, which may be in the hearts of Europeans and 
yet was far from the minds at present. Rome and Palestine’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
1939, p. 633). Other attendees included former Times editor and author of a book on 
the Habsburg Monarchy, Wickham Steed, the British military writer with a special 
interest in the Balkans, Vandeleur Robinson, and another colonial official, Sir Ronald 
Storrs. By contrast to the discussion in 1931 in the same context, when Coudenhove 
and his audience agreed that Britain could not be part of Pan-Europe, foregoing its 
special obligations to the Commonwealth, the atmosphere in 1939 had changed. 
The background for this change was Coudenhove’s conception of Soviet and Nazi 
totalitarianism which he thought the alliance with Britain would help mitigate. The 
1937 edition of this book pitted the British Union Jack against the Soviet hammer 
and sickle on its cover, with the profile of Athena representing Europe in its head 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1937b). 
Another dramatic change was Coudenhove’s exile to New York and the 
replacement of Vienna with New York as the capital of Pan-European movement. 
After the annexation of Austria by Germany in 1938, when Coudenhove was forced 
to flee Austria, the movement’s central idea to revive a European multi-ethnic 
empire with a base in Vienna had evidently failed. In 1940, the Coudenhoves left 
Europe for New York. Obtaining a teaching post in history and politics at New York 
University, supported by the Carnegie Foundation, Coudenhove revived Paneuropa 
in exile by founding a ‘Research Centre for European reconstruction’, which hosted 
a Paneuropean congress there in 1943, inviting other exiles from Europe. ‘‘It is 
our conviction that dismemberment of our continent or its partition into spheres 
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of influence would inevitably lead, in a near future, to World War III. Fifteen ex-
Europeans in the U.S. last week raised this warning against Yalta, Dumbarton 
Oaks, the whole trend of Big Three power-thinking. Their alternative: a European 
confederation of independent states, linked by a continental Parliament, Cabinet, 
President and Army. Principal sponsor of last week’s ‘Declaration of European 
Interdependence’ was Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi.’ (Time Magazine, 
1945). Coudenhove had been popularising his Paneuropean idea in the United States 
in the 1920s, too, at a time when visits by the European aristocracy were covered 
by the country’s illustrated press.32 Indeed, the New York Times contains some of 
the most consistent international press coverage in the history of the movement. 
In the 1940s, his idea of Europe focused on the struggle against totalitarianism of 
the Nazi and Soviet variant, before becoming more oriented on democratic values 
as we would understand them today after the Second World War. Throughout this 
period, his community of followers was organised into national groups, even though 
there was a strong German influence since the movement’s main journal Paneuropa, 
appeared mostly in German. The movement and its journal, Paneuropa, was as much 
a collection of proposals for the future as it was a receptacle for a variety of ideas and 
a mouthpiece for polling public opinions on all things European. Coudenhove’s ideas, 
first nurtured on the ruins of the Habsburg empire, appeared utopian and idealistic 
and were often mocked and caricatured in the interwar period. In the heyday of Nazi 
propaganda, he attracted intense criticism for his utopianism regarding the question 
of race by key Nazi foreign policy ideologue Max Clauss, editor of the foreign 
language magazine Signal, who saw Coudenhove as a pawn in the hands of a British-
dominated Europe (Max, 1943).33 Paneuropa faded from view in European political 
discourse during Nazi Germany’s rapid expansion in the Second World War, when 
Coudenhove himself went into exile to Switzerland and then to the United States. 
The years of the war coincided with a far greater openness in Coudenhove’s mind 
regarding the relationship between Europe’s geographical frontiers and its political 
salvation from the menace of Nazism (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1935). In this period, 
Coudenhove became more critical of democracy and in fact admitted the need to 
be pragmatic about the form of government in the face of greater threats such as 
totalitarianism (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1936). But during Europe’s second postwar, 
Coudenhove’s plans appeared in a new light, as they came to be entangled with the 
practical project of European integration which was spearheaded by such politicians 
32 Cf. Coudenhove’s visit to Chicago covered in the LA Times: ‘Seek United States of Europe: Advocates Plan 
Congress in Vienna’, Los Angeles Times, 3 December 1925, 3.
33 The propaganda journal Signal, edited under the auspices of the Wehrmacht, appeared from 1940 to 1945 
in more than fifteen languages, except German, with a circulation size of up to two million – most of it in 
France. See esp. ‘Map of Europe’s cultural and historical development’, in Clauss (1944). See also Clauss, 
(1942) and Dollinger (1969). From Facsimile Querschnitte durch Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, 14 (Munich, 
Bern, Vienna: Scherz, 1969). On Signal in context, cf. Majer and Höhne (2014). 
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as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, and regarded with benevolence by Winston 
Churchill. At this point, Coudenhove returned to his earlier conception whereby the 
emerging Soviet civilization was Europe’s main enemy. The importance of joint 
colonial administration – central to his proposals in the 1920s – was now also carefully 
omitted, as were his ideas of a corporatist state which smacked rather too much of 
central and southern Europe’s governments of the right from the interwar period. 
 
Into the Cold War: Anti-Sovietism as a Source of European Unity
Immediately after the end of the war, Coudenhove returned to Europe, resuscitating 
his acquaintance with Leo Amery and with Winston Churchill, whose famed Zurich 
speech for a United States of Europe, given in 1946 to inspire a new union of Western 
European States, owed its ideological foundations to Coudenhove. As he put it, the 
work of Pan-European unification ‘owes so much to Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’. 
Just like Coudenhove, who postulated the example of the union of Swiss cantons as 
an example for Europe, Churchill concluded his admonition for a need for Europe 
to unite by postulating that Europe should be ‘as free and happy as Switzerland 
is today’ (Churchill, 1950, p. 199 ff). At the same time, as far as his own nation 
was concerned, Churchill indicated that alongside this European Switzerland, there 
was still room for a British Empire which was associated but not integrated in the 
European Union of states.34 On top of these efforts, Coudenhove also mobilized 
his connections with Catholic dissident circles of anti-Nazi resistance, including 
Konrad Adenauer, with the desire to firmly promote a Paneuropean Union through a 
European party. By writing another retrospective on his own lifework, Coudenhove 
made sure that his name was not forgotten as new projects for European unity got 
under way (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1949).
The economic experiences of the Paneuropean community were still useful in the 
interwar and wartime period, and Coudenhove had an impact on the design of the 
Marshall plan35 On the whole, Coudenhove’s activities for European integration in 
the period after World War II were far less extensive and he refused to associate 
with most other European integration movements. The only organization he was 
formally involved with at this stage was the Centre for European Documentation 
and Information (CEDI). Located between the Dreyfusard intellectual elitists and 
the fascist neo-imperialists, and influenced by propaganda institutions such as the 
Comintern and the CIA which were founded between the mid-1930s and the 1940s, it 
was a centralised office for the propagation of European unity. Initiated by Otto von 
Habsburg, who, like Coudenhove, lived in exile in New York, it was also supported by 
34 On Churchill’s first discussion of Coudenhove’s work, see Churchill (1930).
35 On Coudenhove-Kalergi as an inspiration for the European League for Economic Cooperation headed by 
Jacques Lacour-Gayet and Daniel Serruys, see Kunz (1948).
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General Franco of Spain. By the time of his death in 1972, Coudenhove’s Paneuropa 
Union had been taken over by Otto von Habsburg, who merged it with CEDI.36
Increasingly, Coudenhove’s vision of Europe’s future depended on opposition to 
the Soviet Union more than any other political entity. Would the European Union 
have ever been viable without the Soviet Union? The political thought of Richard 
Coudenhove-Kalergi enables historians to engage with this question through a 
biographical lens. Modernity was a key to joining civilization; but a glorious past 
such as Europe could not be retrospectively manufactured. Thus Europe was the only 
continent which did not technically require the endorsement of modernity in order to 
count as civilised. 
Coudenhove’s ever-changing notion of Europe, which is expressed in the title of 
one of his brochures, ‘Europe To-Morrow’, reflects what Reinhart Koselleck has 
described as a special semantic of time in periods of political crises (Koselleck, 2006). 
His Europeanism allowed to reinvigorate Europe’s capacity for political hegemony in 
the age of imperial decline. This semantic was the product of a political moment that 
was symbolically associated with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 – but in reality, 
percolated throughout western Europe as well as Asia Minor through numerous other 
types of revolution and radical transformation, including Mustafa Kemal’s shaping 
of modern Turkey. His case also foregrounds the role of German intellectuals within 
the cultural construction of the West, which is otherwise more prominently associated 
with transatlantic discourses such as Winston Churchill’s Fulton Speech. 
Coudenhove’s status as the prophet of a political movement which crossed party 
political and national boundaries could be usefully compared with the cross-party 
and parapolitical movements which are currently emerging in Europe and in the 
transatlantic world on the left and the right.37 Coudenhove’s idea of establishing a 
dedicated news outlet – the Paneuropa Verlag - which would allow him to defend his 
conception of Europe’s future in an ‘unbloody war’ could be used to put twenty-first 
century efforts to renew the media landscape in historical perspective. His emphasis 
on surveys and questionnaires, which he used not only to gauge opinions but primarily 
to disseminate his own ideas, echoed the political uses of plebiscites and referenda 
in a volatile Europe of his day. Now, as new forms of mass political mobilisation 
have shifted European frontiers once again in places like Crimea, it is instructive to 
revisit the work of this one-man propagandist as a small case study of soft power. His 
example allows for a better understanding of the social and intellectual mechanisms 
by which ideologies of soft power evolved between the age of empire and the age 
of the Cold War, before becoming appropriated by other political movements which 
36 On this period of Coudenhove’s influence, see Conze, Abendland und Westeuropa, 76 ff.
37 For a good analysis, see, for instance, Plattner (2010) and Eichengreen (2017).
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were either more violent, like Nazi conceptions of Europe, or more forceful, like 
Europe’s post-World War II integration. A mixture of idealistic liberalism and political 
opportunism, Coudenhove’s changing notion of European civilization shows that the 
cultural Iron Curtain could also be seen as one of the long-term effects of Europe’s 
postimperial succession crisis.38 Understanding the intellectual impact of imperial 
decline in the long-term might also help current analyses of the new populism in the 
‘West’, as well as the anti-European ‘pan-movements’ of the age of globalisation.39
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